How it might affect the president’s popularity

Hi 00:46

Next Sunday, November 24, will be the second round of presidential elections in Uruguay. This new quote with the ballot boxes will put in front of the two political formations responsible for the country’s democratic solidity, the centroderecha government coalition, the current governing force, and the centroizquierdista Frente Amplio.

In the first round el Frente Amplio resulted in a more voted force with 43.9%. A result that was better than he obtained in 2019 at the same instance (39%), but far from the expectations of his militancy and referents. Sin embargo, an unexpected result fue que el Frente se asiguró el control del senado al obtain dieciséis escaños of a total of thirty. Others interpretaron esto as a clear sign from above possibilities to impose and in the second vuelta, although se olvidaron de bring el espadodo empírico corresponding.

Por su parte, the parties that conform to the center-right official coalition, calculating that it was very improbable that the Frente Amplio would obtain an absolute majority of votes, focused on the first round as a kind of bloc primaries. On the “internal” it was necessary to show clarity about which of the top precandidatos presidenciales contaba cu mayor espadodo electoral and, in addition, update the state of correlation of internal forces in the conglomerate. Los resultados ratified Álvaro Delgado as presidential candidate and the Partido Nacional (26.7%) as rector of the officialist coalition, as a whole, he consiguió una votación superior (47.6) to Frente Amplio.

La experiencia comparada consigna que, en Latin America, la popularidad positiva o negativa del presidente de turno tends to be associated with him electoral result del oficialismo including en segundas vueltas electorales. It certainly doesn’t do it in the same way. While the negative approval of the executive preaches in a forceful way the officialist defeat and the alternation in power, the positive popularity of the president announces the continuity of officialism in power, but in a looser form.

The reason for the difference lies in that, and well the satisfactory perception of the exercise of the president of turno in the citizenship arroba and the potential of the possibilities of the official presidencial candidate, only makes it bajo on the condition that he partido or coalition of government in which the electoral campaign sin encontrarse affected por una open internal division a solapada. Por eso tienen razón quienes han signalado that I leave probabilities of retaining el poder por parte of the republican coalition dependen de la form in which they manage in this decisive phase las diferencias y expectantes de los partidos que la integran.

La coalición republicana tuvo una recent experience in the matter. Rumbo a la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de 2019, when it was just being constituted as an electoral coalition, but it had its favor that los ciudadanos uruguayos of general form disapproved of the notorious form of the management of then president frenteamplista Tabaré Vazquez, of the republican coalition por probleme of internal cohesion suffered an important flight of votes that led to obtain a triunfo in extrem reñido que les amargó el festejo.

To the positive popularity of presidente Luis Lacalle Pou, to the survival of the governing coalition to a large extent from a complicated mandatory and especially to the opportunity to manifest certain learning on the management of internal conflicts in the environment of the electoral campaign could be offering the runway on them. that will happen the last week of November in the South American country.

In Uruguay, el Frente Amplio competed two occasions en seconds turns arropado by the aprobar positiva de su mandatorios, Tabaré Vazquez (56%) in your first mandate and José Mujica (50%), respectively. In both cases, he presidencial candidate from the centroizquierda formation terminó imponiendo de forma inobjetable. On average, in both elecciones to the transfer of positive presidential popularity he alcanzó 105%. But, these outstanding levels of transfer could be conditioned by the degree of internal cohesion, which ends up reaching el Frente Amplio, without a doubt superior to those from the coalition of right-wing parties, which only has five years of existence.

By the side, in the region, when the proxies arrived in the electoral campaign with a positive evaluation, the governing party or coalition does not present a problem of internal cohesion and the candidacy of the officialism did not fall back in el propio presidente de turno seeking. his successive reelection, the transfer fee from the positive popularity was almost 102%. But, the number of cases supporting this is also relatively small, and the difference between smaller cases and larger transfers regrettably reflects significant variation.

Los datos aportados no arrojan un resulta concluyente sobre cuál fuerza política in the end they get las preférences del electorado, instead offerin un rango aproximado del caudal de votos potenciales that could take the officialism in the second turn.

In recent years, various comparative investigations have raised knowledge about the development trends of presidential elections in democracy in the region. Con base en ese knowledge, lo que en realitate supondría a surprise in the second vuelta de los comicios presidenciales de Uruguay de 2024 would not be exactly el triunfo officialista but to defeat. Dicho result, desde el punto de vista strictly comparative, the justification including the definition as an emblematic case study..

*Professor and researcher from the Universidad de Guadalajara. Latin America21.